Benjamin F. Butler Instructions, 28 September 1864
#309 Bejamin F. Butler
Genl. Butler written to take
Richmond—Sept 28, 1864 /
1 Confidential
Headquarters Department Virginia & North Carolina
In the Field Sept. 28th 1864
To Maj Genl. Ord Comdg 18th Corps
Maj Genl Birney Comdg 10th Corps
Brig Genl Kautz Comdg Div of Cavalry
Pursuant to the verbal directions and written instructions of the Lieut. Genl Comdg, the Army of the James is about to make a movement on the North side of the James River.
Its Object
Is to surprise the Confederate forces in our front here and passing them to get possession of the city of Richmond. Failing that, to make such serious and determined demonstration to that end as shall draw reinforcements from the left right of the enemys line in sufficient numbers so as to enable the Army of the Potomac to move upon the enemy's communication near Petersburg.
The forces appropriated to the purpose are so much of the "Army of the James" as can be spared from the lines at Bermuda Hundred and the garrisoned posts on the River—the strength of which forces you know
The manner in which the movement is to be made.
The Acting Chief of Engineers will have caused by twelve (12) o'clock midnight of the 28th inst. a /
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a sufficient pontoon bridge, well covered to prevent noise to be laid from the road on the South side of the James to a point near Varina or Aikens Landing.
The 18th Army Corps with the exception of the colored Division at Deep Bottom will move across that bridge and make an attack upon the enemy's line in the manner hereinafter to be detailed.
At the same time the 10th Corps will cross the pontoon bridge at Deep Bottom and make in like manner and at the same time, demonstration in connection with the third (3d) Division of the 18th Corps, from that point.
The position and numbers of the enemy.
As near as can be ascertained, the enemy hold a line of earthworks starting at a point at or near Cox's Ferry, at a station called by them Signal Hill, running thence easterly in the rear of Cox's overseer's house, from thence to a point in the rear of J. Aikens' house to the hill in rear of the point marked "Newmarket" on the map, across the Varina road partially along the Kingsland road which line it is believed terminates substantially as a continuous entrenched line at that point. Most of the line has Abbattis but no ditch.
The troops holding that line from all the information gathered, save are Bushrod Johnsons (Tennessee) Brigade about four hundred and fifty (450) men for duty with its pickets advanced beyond Cox's overseer's house toward Dutch Gap holding the line nearly three quarters of a /
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mile beyond that point to a point near the Varina Road at a point about three hundred (300) yards to the West of which the line of breastworks terminates—to be resumed on the other side of road.
The 25th Va. (City Battallion) numbering not to exceed two hundred (200) men for duty, are extended along the line toward Buffin's House in front of our position at Deep Bottom. They They are there joined by Bennings (old) Georgia Brigade commanded by Col. Dubow numbering about four hundred (400) men who are extended along the line past Buffin's house—the picket line being near the house of J. Aikens.
They are there joined by Gregg's Texas Brigade numbering about four hundred men (400) for duty who extend along the line to a place called Newmarket where the enemy have a pretty strong works, on a height commanding the Newmarket Road.
These are all the infantry forces except a Battallion of Militia reserves numbering about one hundred and seventy five (175) men for duty from a connecting line between Johnson's Brigade composed of soldiers below the age of eighteen (18) and above the age of Forty five (45) but they with the City Battallion have never been under fire.
At the place marked on the map "Drill Room" /
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is stationed a regiment believed to be about four hundred men (400) the 7th South Carolina Cavalry.
At the place marked "Sweeny's Pottery" Wade Hampton's Legion numbering about four hundred (400) men are stationed on the easterly side of "Four Mile Creek" and "Bailey's Run" apparently to guard the road by which General Hancock advanced over "Strawberry Plains" from below "Four Mile Creek" and picketting out toward Malvern Hill. In the redoubt of the intersection of the roads near the point marked "W. Throngmorton" is a regiment, the 24th Va. Cavalry, numbering about four hundred (400) men.
In Chaffin's farm there is no garrison except about one hundred (100) heavy artillerists holding that place, as an intrenched camp. It is also a camp for the sick and convalescents of the Va. Battallion.
There are then no other troops between the troops herein enumerated and Richmond except an Artillery Company on each of the detached works of that class numbered Twenty three (23) on the map and the one at "Toll Gate" and the "Race Course—The continuous line of works shown on the map are wholly unoccupied.
It will be seen therefore that these bodies of which we have knowledge, if the information is correct should be Two thousand eight hundred and seventy five (2875) men and it may be /
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safely predicated that there are not three thousand (3000) effective men outside of the limits of the City of Richmond on the North side of the River.
It is upon this information, which is fully credited that the movement is largely based
The means of reinforcement by the Enemy.
There are between the Appomattox and the James less than Thirty five hundred (3500) men holding a line nearly ten (10) miles in extent and the nearest considerable body of Confederate Troops are massed some seven (7) miles still further off below Petersburg.
Most of the force between the Appomattox and the James is directly in the front of our lines and cannot be much depleted.
Their means of crossing the River are by the pontoon bridge, one between the fortifications of Drury's Bluff on the West and Chaffin's Farm on the East of the James. These fortifications are about a mile apart and have two or three barbette guns bearing on the bridge heads. There is no other tete du port. This is a pontoon bridge and is above fortifications at Chaffin's on the one side and below Drurys on the other These fortifications are about a mile apart Next a trestle work bridge with schooners for a /
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draw at a point opposite the place of William Throgmorton at the mouth of "Falling Creek" landing on the Westerly side of the River at the Southerly side of the mouth of the Creek—again a trestle bridge at a point opposite Col. Knight's house, another trestle bridge nearly opposite the battery marked twenty three (23) on plan. These three last have no tetes du port on the North side
The Manner of Attack
A large element of the complete success of this movement depends upon its celerity and the cooperation in point of time of the several commands in the attack—It is proposed that Maj. Genl Ord shall dispose one of the Divisions of the his Corps in such positions as to mass them near Varina on the North bank during the night silently so as not to be observed by the enemy and from thence just before daybreak which is assumed to be thirty (30) minutes past four (4) oclock A.M. and that will govern in point of time to make a sudden, sharp attack in column upon the enemy's lines nearly opposite his position upon the Varina Road. At the same time Genl. Birney having massed such Divisions as he chooses or using the 3d Division of the 15th Corps at Deep Bottom for that purpose for which it will temporarily report to him, will make a like attack /
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substantially at the point where he attacked before in the late essay across the James and endeavor to carry the Newmarket road and the heights adjacent if he cannot turn them to the left without too great loss.
If successful and as soon as the way can be opened Genl Kautz Cavalry having been massed near the pontoon bridge at Deep Bottom and crossing while the attack is going on will immediately push out, attempt to cross the Newmarket road turning the enemy's forces and left flank if possible, avoiding a fight as a preference and attempt to reach the "Central" or as it is called in the Country there the "Darbytown Road". If successful in striking that road Genl. Kautz is to make the utmost diligence and celerity of marching up that road toward Richmond or if he finds himself opposed in such manner as to render it advisable he will still further flank to the right and strike the Charles City road as both roads lead into the City within a mile of each other.
If Genl Ord is successful in passing the enemy's line in his front he is to move right on up the Varina road and endeavor to reach the entrenched camp at Chappin's farm and if possible to take it and secure and destroy the pontoon crossing just above
Perhaps Genl Ord will find the better way to take the works at Chaffins Farm is to /
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pass them by the Varina Road or turn them near the house of J Aikens and to pass to the rear as the demoralization of their defenders if any get there from Johnson's command will be greater when they find themselves cut off from Richmond.
Genl Ord will observe that the Varina road runs within two miles of the River and he may be annoyed by the enemy's gunboats but they would seem to amount to an annoyance only at that distance yet an attempt to take the work would seem to be the most feasible from the Northwest side of the salient extending in that direction as there he will be entirely protected from by the high bluff from the fire of the enemy's gunboats.
But much of this detail of course must be left to his discretion on the ground, which he is enjoined to use largely as to modes and places of attack. Genl. Ord is expressly cautioned however to lose no time in attempting to envelope Chaffins Farm but rather if he can take the line of works extending across his path to place what in his judgment may be a sufficient force, with orders to entrench so as to hold the bridge and with the rest of his forces to push up toward the Newmarket road at the junction of which with the Varina road he will probably be met /
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with some force, that being near the station of the Cavalry.
If Chaffin's Farm can be taken a force should be detached to hold it although it becomes of minor importance except as a possible bridge head for a new pontoon bridge to be thrown, brought from the Appomattox but that is a question of time. Leaving sufficient force to protect his rear from the enemy, crossing after striking the Newmarket Junction at which point it is hoped he will be joined by Genl. Birney who will have proceeded up the Newmarket road—Genl Ord will move to the left and attempt to strike the Richmond and Osborne old turnpike and also to detach a force and destroy or hold the bridge at next above and proceed onwards up that road until its junction with the Newmarket road at which point the only other force of the enemy is supposed to be found in the garrisons of the detached works.
Again, an attempt should be made to destroy the bridges opposite Battery twenty three (23)
If these bridges can be destroyed with reasonable celerity there can be but little doubt of the complete success of the movement.
Meanwhile Genl. Birney will have moved by the Newmarket road up to the point of intersection where it may be necessary to turn the works by a flank movement to the left /
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in the direction marked on the map "Cox" but that like the other method of attack must be left largely to the discretion of Genl. Birney. As soon as possible after the advance has been made from Deep Bottom whether the attack is made by the third (3d) Division of the 15th Corps or a Division of the 10th Corps, the third (3d) Division under Genl. Paine will have position upon the left of Genl. Birney's Column of march so that when the junction is formed with Genl. Ord that Division may report to him relieved from its temporary assignment to duty with the 10th Corps.
The Comdg. Genl. of the Army will endeavor to keep himself in communication with the Corps Commanders so as to afford any direction, advice or assistance that may be in his power and by being kept advised of the movements of the one and the other of the Corps Commanders as well as the Command of Genl. Kautz he may be thus enabled to secure more perfect cooperation than would otherwise be possible.
If the movement is made with celerity; if the march is held uninterruptedly as much as possible and if in the first attack the element of unity of time is observed which has been greatly neglected in some of the movements of the Army we shall gain over the enemy so far as any considerable /
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reinforcements are concerned some eight (8) to twelve (12) hours and perhaps more of valuable time which ought not to be lost and which should bring us far on our journey in the twelve (12) miles which we are to go
As the force of the enemy is so small, there will need to be none of those delays for deployments which generally take so much time in movements on the enemy.
If we are not mistaken in the force opposed to us and if we are not we shall learn it very early, that force nor any other that may be got on that side of the river for six (6) hours need give us no alarm or trouble nor indeed when the two Corps have joined need we fear any force which the enemy by possibility can detach from his Army without abandoning his position on the right altogether in which case we shall be likely to get reinforcements nearly as early as he will. Upon approaching the detached works at Richmond if we are fortunate enough to succeed so far, as they will be found to be some three quarters of a mile apart and not connected with rifle pits and as they are all open in the rear, a quick movement of a small column of troops between them will put them into the hands of the attacking party.
Of course, receiving the fire of the heavy guns in position which are manned by inexperienced artillerists and are therefore far less /
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destructive than light guns in the same position.
Getting between two of their works so as to get into the rear would open the gates of Richmond
What is to be done in Richmond.
Whatever Division or other body of troops shall get into Richmond it will be their duty immediately without waiting for parley or doing anything else to proceed at once to the bridges across the James River, seizing upon inhabitants to guide them for that purpose if necessary, and destroy them. Fire is the readiest way of destroying bridges such as these are of wooden spans. As soon as that destruction has been accomplished then unless both Columns and the Cavalry Column have reached the City, as large a body as can possibly be spared will be sent to open the way upon the road by which such tardy column is supposed to be advancing, by a sharp attack upon any enemy opposing, in the rear.
No large body of troops it is believed will be needed for this purpse as the enemy under such circumstances would make no stand.
In case a portion of the troops reach Richmond and the troops holding either bridgehead below Richmond are attacked they are to hold the ground as long as possible, having the moment that they /
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strike the point which they intend to hold, strengthened themselves by intrenchment as much as possible, for which reason the Battallion of Engineers has been ordered to report to Maj. Genl. Ord and will be well at the front, furnished with their intrenching tools.
In case the troops guarding the bridges are forced back they will retire upon the position held by the our Army, not allowing the enemy to get between them and the main body.
In case any portion of the troops have reached Richmond and those outside are attacked by a force of the enemy which they are unable to resist they will retire toward Richmond and not from it.
It being intended if the town is once reached to hold it at all risks and at all hazards and all Commanders of Divisions and others in advance are especially cautioned not to recognize or regard Flags of Truce if any are sent but immediately receiving the bearer to press on. It will be time enough to deal with flags of truce after the object of the expedition is accomplished
Details of the March and of the Equipment of the troops
As so much depends upon the celerity of movement, and the distance over which we are to /
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move is so short the troops will leave everything except a single blanket rolled over their shoulders and haversack with three thr (3) days cooked rations and sixty (60) rounds of cartridge in their cartridge boxes and on their persons.
All tents, camp equipage and cooking utensils are to be left behind. No wagon will be allowed to cross the river without orders from these Headqrs. The wagon trains however will be supplied with six (6) days rations and half forage for the same time and forty (40) rounds of extra ammunition per man ready to start as soon as ordered
The two batteries of horse Artillery reporting to Genl. Kautz will cross and travel with him.
Ambulances will be parked near the Southern head of each pontoon bridge ready to be used when occasion requires.
Hospital boats will be at Deep Bottom for the purpose of receiving any wounded. /
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Genl. Kautz will take with him three (3) days cooked rations per man and what forage he can conveniently carry. Assuming that he is better mounted than the enemy's Cavalry and fresh he will have no difficulty in case it should be necessary to cut loose from the infantry column and circle the City as far as may be necessary remembering always that celerity of movement in Cavalry in a far greater degree than infantry is the principal means of success.
The Comdg. Genl cannot refrain in closing these instructions from pressing one or two points upon the attention of Corps Commanders.
First the necessity of being ready to move and moving at the moment designated.
Secondly the fact that the Comdg. Genl. is under no substantial mistake in regard to the force to be at first encountered and therefore there is no necessity of time spent in reconnoitering or taking special care of the flanks of the moving columns.
The Comdg Genl would also recommend to the Corps Commanders as soon as it may be done with safety from discovering the movement, to infor impress upon each of the Division Commanders with directions for them to transmit the information through their subordinates, even to the privates of the number and kind of troops we are required to meet so there may be no panic from supposed /
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flanking movements of the enemy or attacks in the rear—always a source of demoralization when the troops do not understand the force of the enemy. Let us assure and instruct our men that we are able to fight anything we will find either in front or flank or rear, wherever they may happen to be.
Lastly the Comdg Genl will recommend for promotion to the next higher grade the Brig. Genl. Comdg. Division, Colonel Comd. Brigade and so down to all officers and soldiers of the leading Division Brigade or regiment which first enters Richmond and he doubts not that his recommendation will be approved by the Lieut. Genl. and acted upon by the President and if Richmond is taken he will pledge to the Division, Brigade or regiment first entering the City to each officer and man six (6) months extra pay.
While making this offer so general to officers and men the Comdg. Genl desires to say that he has not included the Maj. Genl's Comdg Corps because he knows of no incentive which could cause them to do them to do their duty with more promptness and efficiency than they will do it.
Benj. F Butler
MajGenl
Comg
[verso]
Genl Butlers inst-
ructions to take
Richmd Sept. 29th
64—Recd—10 PM
28th & sent to
Div commanders
about 1 oclock AM
after they had started
[?]
[?]
DATABASE CONTENT
| (15243) | DOR0048 | Letters | 1864-09-28 |
Tags: Artillery, Camp/Lodging, Cavalry, Destruction of Land/Property, Fall of Richmond, Fighting, Fortifications, Rivers
People - Records: 2
Places - Records: 1
- (42) [origination] ~ Richmond, Virginia
SOURCES
Benjamin F. Butler Instructions, 28 September 1864, DOR0048, Nau Collection
