Lynchburg March 17^th 1872

 

Dear General

                        Your letter is just received. I sent you a copy of my address, to remind you of the fact that you ought to have been present on the occasion, and to show you how much you had lost by being absent.

 

            With regard to your suggestion that I might have modified the statement contained on page 33, by showing that General Lee had sent word to Ewell that "the enemy was flying in a disorganized state on the heights, and that it was only necessary to push ahead and occupy them", I have to say that I was not aware of any such fact, and I undertook to state only what I knew. Taylor mentioned something like this to me since the address was delivered, but I was not aware of it before, and General Lee has mentioned no such part in his report, published since the war in "The Historical Magazine". I think this is a sufficient answer to the criticism. I have always / found it safest, in writing or speaking, not to state more than I know. But I don't know that I would have mentioned it if I had been aware of the fact, because it necessarily would have reflected on Ewell, and, as he was alive then, he might have [?] the accuracy of Taylor's statement. It was only necessary to vindicate General Lee, not to censure Ewell. I might have said with truth, if I had thought proper, that I suggested, urged, and begged that an advance might be made, and that I had sent a message to A. P. Hill, which was delivered to him, asking him to send forward a division and we could take the heights, but he declined. I might also have suggested that if the cavalry had not gone traipsing up to Carlisle, we might have known the position of the enemy's troops, and many other things besides, but all this was unnecessary. The great point which I wished to enforce was that General Lee was not responsible for the failure to gain a decisive victory at Gettysburg, and / that if had his plans had been carried out on the second day, after he decided to fight there, we would have had the victory. I had no hesitation in intimating that Longstreet's delay lost us the battle, because he has deserted to the enemy, and he has made some statements to Swinton, which the latter gives in his book, that are exceedingly unjust to General Lee. It is but fair retaliation on him. I did not care to be the critic of others. There are many allowances to be made for Ewell, for which I was urging the advance, Rodes was suggesting objections; and you know the want of decision in Ewell's character.

 

Many persons seem to think that if we had gone on to the heights the first evening, the victory would have been won at once, and the war closed, and hence I have said what I did. It could have been an advantage to our certainty to have gained those heights the 1^st day, but not such an one as generally supposed—whether the position selected by Meade would have been more favorable to us, I do not know, as I know / nothing of the ground. Some officer once undertook to say to General Lee, that it was a great mistake to fight at Gettysburg according to his opinion, and the General, in that peculiar and quiet way of his, said "Why didn't you tell me that before—even as stupid a man as I am can see that now." This was a very just and cutting criticism on all those prophets, who could so well foretell things—after they had happened.

 

            Your letter of Jany 19^th came here when I was in Richmond, and I did not get it until I returned a little over two weeks ago. I was suffering much with cold when I got back & had many things to attend to, Hence no answer before. I think the scheme of Capt Berry entirely visionary & impracticable, not to say absurd. 200,000 [?] could not be [?] for any such purpose, & there is no use talking about it.

 

            Present my regards to Mrs Lee, and tell her I have been much slandered about the ladies, as well as other things. I always had a great weakness on that score, and have had my heart broken several times. I do not, however, think the camp a proper place for ladies, any more than political meetings and or the poles. Their proper dominion is in their own homes, and you may tell her, that if I am Commander-in-chief in the next war, she need not expect to be allowed to go to the camp, but must be content to stay at home. I will write again about the organization of the division, suggesting name, &c. Yours most truly J. A. Early

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