W. P. Derby to Godfrey Weitzel, 4 May 1883
Springfield May 4th 1883
 
My dear Genl
                        Your favor thankfully received, and it is in keeping with the facts as I have found them, excepting in one point. Your information regarding the order to the 10th Corps is news, though such an order would have been the sensible thing to have put in force. Genls Hawley and Ferrys Brigades constituted the extreme left of the Army of the James that morning and a member of the former (of the 14th Conn) says "he had charge of the pickets at that point; that they could hear the attack at the right before four five oclock, but that they were unmolested (or so nearly so as to not drive in the pickets) until after eight o'clock. No advance was attempted, though he says Genl Terry desired to do so."
 
Your superior knowledge of military matters and superior facilities to obtain information, may make it seem presuming for me to write out my opinions and findings tho perhaps you may find some new ideas or channels for thought.
 
            Genl Ransoms force attacking us was arranged or took position as in the accompanying chart. They had formed under cover of Fort Darling and advanced in line of battle. Knowing our pickets at the right of the road had no supports they ignored them entirely and left them in their rear. The 41st Alabama and 23 Ala acted as skirmishers followed in order by the confederate force of Gracie's and Kempers Brigades in double column by division. Barton formed en echelon upon their right and was supported by Terry's (Hoke's old) Brigade. Cormorants Cavalry Boggs Battery and the Washington Artillery co-operated with this force. This force consisted of twenty regiments / Kempers Brigade all admit the terrible punishment they then got. Even Beauregard admits that he was obliged to send them a regiment from Colquitts Brigade, three regiment of which constituted his reserve.
 
About this time Genl Heckman was impressed with the danger of being flanked, as a part of Gracies Brigade were moving for that purpose. He therefore changed the direction of the 9th N.J. (his right regt) so that it was at right angle with the line of battle; & facing the James, its position being a little to the rear and along the line of the road. He says, "having changed the direction of my regiment (9 NJ) I went to the left where I supposed the 23rd Mass were, and found an advancing line of battle. Supposing them reinforcements I ordered them to face to the rear and charge and the next moment found myself a prisoner." In the report of the 23rd Mass to the "Adjt Genl of Mass" they admit they fell back with a loss of 89 killed wounded and missing Nothing indicates the time. The above rebel authorities after narrating the fearful contest and their heavy loss, also say "we entered your lines where they crossed the turnpike, no force being there to oppose us. Advancing down the road we came to where the coffee pots were temptingly boiling. We drank freely, that it was good we can assure you. It was a treat for us. Gracies Brigade (or the 60th and 59 Ala regts for they only seem to have crossed our lines of that brigade) gave their attention to the 9th NJ. The 1st and 7th Va now say of their movements, "Hearing fireing to our right and rear we swung around and at the point marked "A" found a small body of men who after some talk surrendered without the fireing of a gun. Meantime our left developed another force at "B" There challenge "Who comes there!" was replied to, "the 1st Va!" which was received by them with a shotted salute which killed eight of the 1st Va and wounded scores of others. We then rushed upon them and forced them to surrender." This was the 27th Mass Regt. This all goes to show that the enemy pierced our line on the road and did not really flank our position and it is here only where we differ.
 
We are not disposed to make this particularly prominent in our history as we do not care to seem to criticise our comrades. I take the ground that in the absence of evidence to the contrary it is reasonable to suppose they did the best possible under the circumstances. I am inclined to think it probable that the assault was more concentric upon their position than our own and that when the 9 N.J. withdrew or changed direction, the assault upon their right became more fierce than ever. Perhaps they misunderstood the movement of the 9th N.J. and that created a temporary disorder and falling back. How does this strike your mind?
 
General Butler says flatly "we were surprised" as though had not thus prepared for effective defense. We resent it, for we three times repulsed the enemy before they came up in our rear. He also says we were ordered to stretch wire on our front and neglected to do so. (Disobeyed orders). That we had no proper picket system and neglected the precautions ordered by the commanding general, threw up no defenses &c. Upon each of these points I have confronted him with indisputable evidence to the contrary, till now he admits we may have had pickets and perhaps slight defenses, but he still insists we were surprised and neglected his precautions, and disobeyed in the matter of the wire and says "To this I then attributed and now upon further information I do attribute the misfortune / that happened that to that Brigade that morning in the fog." He ignores Beauregards combination against us and seems to believe that had we had wire, we should have had no more difficulties to contend with than other parts of our line
 
            You say you write from memory, but I can assure you that your memory is quite correct. Genls Smith & Heckman agree fully with you, though their writings do (or did) not indicate as clear an idea of the great disparity of our number as compared with the enemy.
 
I invite a careful study of the sketch sent (which please return) as showing the position of the enemy at the opening of the assault. It is made by information obtained through union and rebel sources and I believe is correct. Should you see errors in it or in my brief description should thank you to write of them at once as my book is now in press. Hope it will be out in June. If you can designate the position of the rest of your Division by brigades would like it.
 
            Thanks for the warm endorsement of the gallant fight made by our brigade. I believe they did their best, our regiment being captured within the works.
Am sorry for Genl Butler that he should seem to think it necessary to defend his military career by throwing disrepute upon his troops It can do us no harm, for we served upon too many fields and under generals who could appreciate soldierly qualities, to leave it possible for him to injure us.
           
With thanks for your kind letter I am
Yours truly
W P. Derby
 
P.S. There seemed to be something wrong all the way from the 6th to the 16th; Was it the plan?
9535
DATABASE CONTENT
(9535)DL1526.011130Letters1883-05-04

Tags: Artillery, Benjamin F. Butler, Cavalry, Death (Military), Defeat/Surrender, Fighting, Food, Injuries, Leadership (Soldiers' Perceptions of), Missing in Action, News, P. G. T. Beauregard, Picket Duty, Prisoners of War, Reading

People - Records: 2

  • (3496) [recipient] ~ Weitzel, Godfrey
  • (3504) [writer] ~ Derby, W. P.

Places - Records: 1

  • (346) [origination] ~ Springfield, Sangamon County, Illinois

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SOURCES

W. P. Derby to Godfrey Weitzel, 4 May 1883, DL1526.011, Nau Collection