M^cLaws ordered to make reconnaissance across Lookout by Longstreet. Recommends a force at Brown’s Ferry to which Long^st replied that he had had it examined by a staff officer who reported it impracticable. Inquiry was made (so M^cLaws was told) of all the number of Long^st’s staff who denied having made any reconnaissance.

 

            On M^cL’s return from Sparta, Bragg told him that “he had ordered Longs^t to take four Div^ns & attack the force which had crossed at Browns ferry x x x but that Gen^l Longs^t had taken but one Divⁿ (Hood’s) and had attacked with but one Brigade” &c

 

            At Lenoir M^cLaws says; “I went forward & reconnoitred & gave it as my opinion that the enemy were then in retreat—as night came on no attack was made. I made inquiries of farmers in the neighborhood and they infomed me that by going on about 4 miles, my command could be put across the RR along which the enemy were moving and that an engagement could be forced in the morning. I reported the fact to Genl Longs^t & he ordered me to stay where I was & be ready to move at day light, but did not receive orders to move until 8 o’clock and then to move within a mile of Campbell’s station x x and wait his coming, if he was not there when I arrived. The courier reported that the enemy had retreated during the night/ leaving 80 wagons & that Gen^l L & staff were with those wagons”

 

            Of Campbell’s station he says, “They retired & we followed them the next day to Knoxville. The next day my advanced brig stormed the outward line of the enemy &c. The next day, after a partial reconnaissance I volunteered to assault the city, my Divⁿ leading. That the enemy were busily fortifying before our eyes, that the work was incomplete as we could see—that I would cause my advance, each man, to carry a bundle of wheat hundreds of which were stacked about my H^dQrs, to fill up the ditch if it was necessary. That if we were to assault we had better do so at once so as to return to Gen^l Bragg &c Gen Long^st declined to order the assault, but waited until we had information that Gen Grant had assaulted Genl Bragg on missionary ridge & had utterly routed his army that two of Grant’s corps were en route, hastening to the assistance of Burnside. Then it was without a word of caution to get ready, orders were given my Divⁿ to assault Knoxville x x I felt that this order was the effect of a panic in the mind of Gen L. that he now realized how much he was to blame for the delay of the last two weeks in doing nothing & making no preparation for either an advance or a retreat, nor for an assault & that to help in this do nothing policy, he had drawn a brig. of Gen Bushrod Johnson from Gen Bragg. He felt that his hitherto non-action was near akin to criminality—/ M^cLaws letter to Long^st giving views as to the assault &”after I had realized, after talking with my brig com^drs how they felt the false position in which they were placed &c”

 

            “Gen Wheeler & muself were in favor of advancing upon Knoxville on the other side of the Holston, where the hills rising abruptly from the river completely commanded the town & were higher than any on this side and besides were but slightly fortified when we arrived before the city, but while we were lying idle, not only were the works just before us being daily strengthened, but the hights across the river were fortified & connected with the city by pon^tn bridges &c &c In the face of all these things—facts patent to every thinking officer and man under me, I shrank from making what was a useless sacrifice of the lives of so many brave & patriotic men, who would necessarily be killed or disabled in the encounter, if persisted in.” Long^st’s reply to M^cLaws note “was that honor demanded that the assault should be made & he directed the point where it should be directed to, asserting that the ditch around the work offered no obstacle to the assault” ditch found to be 14 to 15 feet deep to about 17 feet wide, the slope of parapet netted with wire &c &c “I have been told by Col Hart whose cavalry was in the advance towards Knoxville, that his men went into the city far enough to see the wagons of the enemy, the mules all harnessed, and on the road leading from Knoxville & that he sent back word to Gen L. to advance his infantry & take possession” &c & yet we waited &c”           Beans Station left & then attempted withdrawal of several hundred men

 

            In accounting for his being relieved M^cLaws says; “Gen Long^st saw that he had blundered & was continually blundering x x he knew that I disapproved of his course at Knoxville x  x that he had disregarded my advice & this had followed it. He therefore relieved me from comm^d &c” x x as to court & trial &c. Although but few there were who knew of the outrageous character of the campaign. So outrageous that with all possible desire to be lenient in my judgment, I cannot trust myself to put on paper my real sentiments expressive of the motives which must have inspired the commander & his clique—The least that can be said in their favor is that they were determined to break down Gen Bragg, let it cost what it may. The matter with Gen Burnside could have been settled in 3 days after crossing the Holston. In fact it could have been, the morning after, & then the forces could have returned to Gen Bragg & the miss’y ridge disaster would never have happenened. But in that case Gen Bragg’s star w^d have been still in the ascendant as it was arranged that the [?] should never go back to Gen Bragg “When all the points of this campaign & those incidentally connected with it are considered, there are many who have given harsher name when characterizing the actions of Gen Lg^st & his clique than is used when his motives are ascribed to the gratification of personal malice only” x x x

 

            “His failure at Lookout &c” & his failure to comply with his orders to hasten & engage Burnside & return, & his failure to do anything at all towards the accomplishment of his orders until after the catastrophe had happened (to Bragg) to aid in promoting which he was sent after Burnside. All these things taken in connection with the quiet & unopposed way he was allowed to cross the Holston & to march on to Knoxville, as far as possible from Gen Bragg, has made a good many believe that there must have been collusion between opposing commanders, all tending to the discomfiture of Gen Bragg.

 

            “Although we all know that he (Gen L) was the nominal head of a cabal seeking to depose him (Gen^l Br) x x The conduct of Gen L in the Brown’s ferry transaction showed Gen B that he (Gen L) had better be away from his army than with it as he was the sole cause of the 1^st disaster that had happened to it. And that may have been his prime reason in sending him after Burnside.” x x x

 

“But I have no doubt whatever he (Gen Bragg) had, as he says, ample evidence of disobedience of orders, neglect of duty & want of cordial cooperation & support which resulted in all the disasters after Chickamauga” &c

 

                                                Copy of Letter from Gen E. P. Alexander

 

                                                                                                Savannah Ga Mar 28^th 1888

 

Genl Lafayette M^cLaws

            156 Liberty St. City.

                        Dear General: I have read Law’s paper with a great deal of pleasure and interest. His recollection of the events agrees thoroughly and minutely with my own. I do not think they can be successfully questioned.

                                                                                    Truly Yours,

                                                                                                E. P. A.

SOURCES